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Abstract
Due to the rapid development of new technologies such as cloud computing, Internet of Things (IoT), and
mobile Internet, the data volumes are exploding. Particularly, in the industrial field, a large amount of data
is generated every day. How to manage and use industrial Big Data primely is a thorny challenge for every
industrial enterprise manager. As an emerging form of service, cloud computing technology provides a
good solution. It receives more and more attention and support due to its flexible configuration, ondemand purchase, and easy maintenance. Using cloud technology, enterprises get rid of the heavy data
management work and concentrate on their main business. Although cloud technology has many
advantages, there are still many problems in terms of security and privacy. To protect the confidentiality
of the data, the mainstream solution is encrypting data before uploading. In order to achieve flexible
access control to encrypted data, attribute-based encryption (ABE) is an outstanding candidate. At
present, more and more applications are using ABE to ensure data security. However, the privacy
protection issues during the key generation phase are not considered in the current ABE systems. That is
to say, the key generation center (KGC) knows both of attributes and corresponding keys of each user.
This problem is especially serious in the industrial big data scenario, because it will cause great damage
to the business secrets of industrial enterprises. In this paper, we design a new ABE scheme that protects
user's privacy during key issuing. In our new scheme, we separate the functionality of attribute auditing
and key generating to ensure that the KGC cannot know user's attributes and that the attribute auditing
center (AAC) cannot obtain the user's secret key. This is ideal for many privacy-sensitive scenarios, such
as industrial big data scenario.
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Due to the rapid development of new technologies such as cloud computing, Internet of Things (IoT), and mobile Internet, the data
volumes are exploding. Particularly, in the industrial field, a large amount of data is generated every day. How to manage and use
industrial Big Data primely is a thorny challenge for every industrial enterprise manager. As an emerging form of service, cloud
computing technology provides a good solution. It receives more and more attention and support due to its flexible configuration,
on-demand purchase, and easy maintenance. Using cloud technology, enterprises get rid of the heavy data management work
and concentrate on their main business. Although cloud technology has many advantages, there are still many problems in terms
of security and privacy. To protect the confidentiality of the data, the mainstream solution is encrypting data before uploading. In
order to achieve flexible access control to encrypted data, attribute-based encryption (ABE) is an outstanding candidate. At present,
more and more applications are using ABE to ensure data security. However, the privacy protection issues during the key generation
phase are not considered in the current ABE systems. That is to say, the key generation center (KGC) knows both of attributes and
corresponding keys of each user. This problem is especially serious in the industrial big data scenario, because it will cause great
damage to the business secrets of industrial enterprises. In this paper, we design a new ABE scheme that protects user’s privacy
during key issuing. In our new scheme, we separate the functionality of attribute auditing and key generating to ensure that the
KGC cannot know user’s attributes and that the attribute auditing center (AAC) cannot obtain the user’s secret key. This is ideal for
many privacy-sensitive scenarios, such as industrial big data scenario.

1. Introduction
Due to the rapid development of new technologies such
as cloud computing, Internet of Things (IoT), and mobile
Internet, the data volumes are exploding, and we have
truly entered the era of “Big Data.” Big Data technology
has been focused and applied to almost every industry,
retail, healthcare, financial services, government, and so on.
Particularly, in the field of industrial production, a large
amount of data is generated every day, and it includes
business data from information systems, machine data from
industrial IoT systems, and some other data from related
websites, etc. For a manufacturing enterprise, Big Data can
not only be used to improve the efficiency of the business,
but more importantly change the manufacturing process and

business model. Industrial Big Data is the core of intelligent
manufacturing and industrial IoT and provides the most
favorable support for the development of Industry 4.0. How
to manage and use industrial Big Data efficiently is a great
challenge for every enterprise manager.
Cloud computing technology can provide better solutions
to the above challenge. Using cloud technology, enterprises
get rid of the heavy data management work and concentrate on their main business. Nowadays, large cloud service providers, such as Amazon, Microsoft, IBM, etc., have
launched industrial cloud platforms, and more and more
industrial enterprises migrate their data to these platforms.
However, hosting data to third-party platforms will create
new problems, because the security and privacy of the
data have to depend on the credibility of the third-party.
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For businesses, the biggest concern is the confidentiality
of industrial data. The main solution to this problem is to
use encrypting methods to protect data before uploading it.
However, traditional symmetric and asymmetric encryption
schemes are not appropriate for providing fine-grained access
control. Therefore, the above problems have brought new
challenges to data encryption, and numerous studies have
focused on these issues [1–3].
Among various solutions, attribute-based encryption
(ABE) [4, 5] has become an excellent candidate because of
its ability to provide data confidentiality and fine-grained
access control for cloud storage. Currently, more and more
industrial enterprises are using ABE. In an industrial alliance,
enterprises can share encrypted data based on the attributes.
Only those enterprises whose attributes meet the access policy can decrypt the encrypted data. Although much research
has been done on ABE [6–8], there are still some problems
that have not been solved well. The current ABE systems do
not consider privacy protection during the key generation
phase. That is to say, the key generation center (KGC) knows
the attributes and corresponding keys of each user in this
system. This causes great damage to the user’s privacy and
data confidentiality. Particularly, in the application scenarios
of industrial big data, the attributes of enterprise users may
be related to the business secrets of enterprises.
1.1. Our Contribution. In order to solve the privacy protection
problem in key generation phase, we propose a new ABE
system, in which we separate the functionality of attribute
auditing and key extracting to ensure that the KGC does not
know the specific attributes of the user and that the attribute
auditing center (AAC) does not obtain the user’s key. In this
system, when user applies its private key, it authenticates its
attributes to AAC first and gets a blind token, which only
certificates its attributes blindly and reveals nothing about
specific attributes. The user presents the blind token to the
KGC to obtain the corresponding blind key, from which user
can extract the final private key. During this process, no
information about the user’s attributes is leaked to the KGC,
and no information about the private key is leaked to the
AAC. We implicitly use the oblivious transfer (OT) protocol
to solve this problem. This protects the user’s privacy during
key generation phase.
Our ABE is suitable for privacy sensitive scenarios.
Particularly, in the encryption system of industrial cloud, the
attributes often involve business secrets of industrial enterprises. KGC, as a technology department, should not know
these types of secret information. Therefore, we expressly
introduce an application of our new scheme in the industrial
cloud.
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became a precedent for attribute-based encryption. In 2006,
Goyal et al. [5] first proposed the formal definition of
attribute-based encryption (ABE), which classifies as keypolicy ABE (KP-ABE) and ciphertext-policy ABE (CP-ABE).
They also constructed the first KP-ABE scheme. In the next
year, Bethencourt et al. [10] gave the CP-ABE construction
for the first time. In a CP-ABE scheme, the encryptor sets
an access policy in the ciphertext to determine which kind
of users can decrypt the data. This is very consistent with the
security requirements of cloud storage. In recent years, more
and more researches focus on CP-ABE [11–13]. However, none
of the aforementioned works deals with privacy protection
problem in the key generation phase.
1.2.2. Oblivious Transfer. The concept of oblivious transfer
(OT) is originally proposed by Rabin [14] in 1981, and
then it became an important basic primitive in the field of
cryptography. In an OT protocol, the sender delivers part of
messages to the receiver and is still unaware of which parts (if
any) are delivered. In other words, a secure OT protocol must
satisfy two security features: (1) the sender cannot obtain the
selection information of the receiver; (2) the receiver cannot
obtain any information about other messages except for its
choice.
In 1985, Even et al. [15] presented a specific 1-out-of2 OT protocol (𝑂𝑇21 ), in which the sender 𝑆 has 2 values,
and receiver 𝑅 only gets one of them. Then, Brassard et
al. [16] extended 𝑂𝑇21 to 𝑂𝑇𝑛1 . In 1998, Stern [17] gave a
generalized construction of OT protocol based on public key
encryption. In 2001, Naor and Pinkas [18] gave a 2-round
𝑂𝑇𝑛1 protocol based on Diffie-Hellman assumption without
random oracle. In the same year, Aiello et al. [19] constructed
a 2-round 𝑂𝑇𝑛1 protocol based on homomorphic publickey encryption. In 2002, Tzeng [20] gave an 𝑂𝑇𝑛1 protocol
with better round complexity and better communication
complexity. In 2003, Ishai et al. [21] proposed OT extension,
from which a large number of OTs can be performed
using only cheap symmetric-key operations. In the past
decades, OT protocol has been fully studied and widely used
[22–25].
1.3. Organization. In Section 2, we introduce the preliminaries of this paper. In Section 3, we introduce the concept of
attribute-based encryption with privacy preserving key generation (PPKG-ABE) and its security definition. In Section 4,
we propose a specific PPKG-ABE scheme and analyze its
security in Section 5. In Section 6, we introduce the application of PPKG-ABE in industrial cloud environment for
protecting the security of industrial Big Data.

2. Preliminaries
1.2. Related Work
1.2.1. Attribute-Based Encryption. Attribute-based encryption is a one-to-many public key encryption. Only the user,
whose attributes satisfy the access policy set by the encryptor,
can decrypt the ciphertext. This concept originates from
identity-based encryption [9]. In 2005, Sahai and Waters [4]
proposed the concept of fuzzy identity encryption, which

2.1. CP-ABE. In CP-ABE system, there are three types of
entities, i.e., key generation center (KGC), encryptor, and
decryptor. The KGC issues secret key according to users’
attributes. The encryptor encrypts the messages according
to a designated access policy. The decryptor can decrypt
the ciphertext successfully only if its attributes satisfy the
corresponding access policy.
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There are four algorithms in a CP-ABE scheme:
(1) Setup: it takes security parameters as input and
outputs public parameters 𝑃𝑃 and master secret key 𝑀𝑆𝐾.
(2) KeyGen: it takes public parameters 𝑃𝑃, master secret
key 𝑀𝑆𝐾, and a set of attributes 𝑆 as input and outputs secret
key 𝑆𝐾𝑆 corresponding to 𝑆.
(3) Encryption: it takes public parameters 𝑃𝑃, access
policy W, and message 𝑀 as input and outputs the ciphertext
𝐶𝑇W .
(4) Decryption: it takes public parameters 𝑃𝑃, ciphertext
𝐶𝑇W , and secret key 𝑆𝐾𝑆 as input and outputs the message 𝑀,
if and only if the attributes 𝑆 satisfy the access policy W; i.e.,
𝑆 ⊨ W.
2.2. Oblivious Transfer. The oblivious transfer (OT) protocol
is a two-party computation protocol in which one party is the
sender (S) and the other is the recipient (R). The protocol
ensures the following: S sends a group of messages to R. R
can get a subset of these messages, but S does not know which
messages that R received.
In this paper, we draw on a classic (𝑂𝑇21 ) protocol [26]:
Party S has two elements 𝛿0 , 𝛿1 of group G and party R
has a bit 𝑏 ∈ {0, 1}. The descriptions of group G are known to
both parties, where |G| = 𝑞 and 𝑔 is a generator.
(1) R randomly chooses 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾 ∈ [1, 𝑞] and sets 𝜏 as
follows:
(a) If 𝜎 = 0, then 𝜏 = (𝑔𝛼 , 𝑔𝛽 , 𝑔𝛼𝛽 , 𝑔𝛾 ).
(b) If 𝜎 = 1, then 𝜏 = (𝑔𝛼 , 𝑔𝛽 , 𝑔𝛾 , 𝑔𝛼𝛽 ).
R sends 𝜏 to S.
(2) S receives 𝜏 = (𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧0 , 𝑧1 ). Then, S checks 𝑧0 ≠ 𝑧1 .
If not, it outputs ⊥, and aborts.
In addition, S chooses 𝑢0 , 𝑢1 , V0 , V1 ∈ [1, 𝑞] randomly and
computes the following 4 values:
𝜔0 = 𝑥𝑢0 ⋅ 𝑔V0 ,
𝑢

𝑘0 = (𝑧0 ) 0 ⋅ 𝑦V0
𝜔1 = 𝑥𝑢1 ⋅ 𝑔V1 ,

(1)

𝑢

𝑘1 = (𝑧1 ) 1 ⋅ 𝑦V1
Then, S calculates 𝑐0 = 𝑥0 ⋅ 𝑘0 , 𝑐1 = 𝑥1 ⋅ 𝑘1 and sends
(𝜔0 , 𝑐0 ) and (𝜔1 , 𝑐1 ) to R.
Finally, R calculates 𝑘𝜎 = (𝜔0 )𝛽 and obtains 𝛿𝜎 = 𝑐𝜎 ⋅
(𝑘𝜎 )−1 .
2.3. Bilinear Maps. Let G1 , G2 , and G𝑇 be three 𝑞 order cyclic
groups. The bilinear pairing operation 𝑒 is a bilinear map, 𝑒 :
G1 × G2 → G𝑇, and satisfies the following properties:
(1) ∀𝑔 ∈ G1 , ∀ℎ ∈ G2 , ∀𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑍∗𝑞 , there is 𝑒(𝑔𝑥 , ℎ𝑦 ) =
𝑒(𝑔, ℎ)𝑥𝑦 (2) ∃𝑔0 ∈ G1 , ∃ℎ0 ∈ G2 , 𝑒(𝑔0 , ℎ0 ) ≠ 1(3) ∀𝑔 ∈ G1 ,
∀ℎ ∈ G2 , 𝑒(𝑔, ℎ) can be computed in polynomial time
In this paper, we use asymmetric bilinear groups; that is,
G 1 ≠ G 2 .
2.4. Security Assumption
Definition 1. Let G1 , G2 , and G𝑇 form bilinear groups, let
𝑔 be a generator of G1 , and let ℎ be a generator of G2 . For

Key Generation Center
(KGC)
(3)

Attribute Audit Center
(AAC)
(1)

(4)

(2)
(5)
User

Figure 1: System model.

𝑖

some unknown 𝛼 ∈ Z∗𝑝 , define 𝑔𝑖 = 𝑔𝛼 , and set →
𝑦 𝑔,𝛼,𝑛 =
(𝑔1 , . . . , 𝑔𝑛 , 𝑔𝑛+2 , . . . , 𝑔2𝑛 ). We say an algorithm B solves 𝑛
BDHE problem with advantage 𝜖, if on input 𝑔, ℎ,→
𝑦 𝑔,𝛼,𝑛 ,



𝑃𝑟 [B (𝑒 (𝑔𝑛+1 , ℎ)) = 1] − 𝑃𝑟 [B (𝑍) = 1] ≥ 𝜖,

(2)

where 𝑍 is a random element of G∗𝑇.
The decision 𝑛-BDHE assumption holds if 𝜖 is negligible
for any polynomial algorithm.

3. Attribute-Based Encryption with Privacy
Preserving Key Generation
In the key generation phase of traditional ABE, KGC always
knows the attribute information of each user. This has greatly
damaged the privacy of users. In order to solve this problem,
we separate the two functions of attribute auditing and key
extracting. We introduce an attribute audit center (AAC)
in ABE system to authenticate the attributes of users and
to make blind token for them. KGC, as a simple technical
support institution, is only responsible for generating keys,
but it does not know the corresponding attributes of these
keys.
3.1. System Model. In the key generation phase (as shown
in Figure 1), there are three types of entities: attribute audit
center (AAC), key generation center (KGC), and data user. In
this system, user submits its attributes and relevant evidence
to AAC. The AAC audits the user’s attributes and returns a
blind token with the signature of AAC to user. In practical
applications, AAC is often carried out by the institutions that
provide certification for user’s attributes, such as government
offices, because they know the attributes of users themselves
and do not cause extra leaks. In other words, the blind
token is the evidence for users owning some attributes. This
token does not reveal any information of user’s attributes and
only ensures the authenticity. When user needs to obtain its
attributes key, it will submit the blind token to KGC, which is
a technical institution. The KGC first checks the legitimacy of
the token; if the token is invalid, it aborts; otherwise, it runs
the key generation algorithm on the token and returns a blind
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key. After user obtains the blind key, it extracts the secret key
locally.
The specific process is as follows:
(1) The user shows its attributes and relevant evidence to
the attribute audit center (AAC).
(2) The AAC audits the user’s attributes and returns a
blind token to the user with its signature.
(3) When a user needs to obtain its attributes key, it
will submit its blind token to the key generation center
(KGC). The KGC cannot get any information about the user’s
attributes. It only can confirm that the user truly has related
attributes.
(4) The key generation center (KGC) first checks the
legitimacy of the token, and if the signature is illegal, it aborts;
otherwise, it runs the key generation algorithm and outputs a
blind key.
(5) The user receives the blind key from KGC and extracts
the private key.
3.2. Syntax. In detail, an attribute-based encryption with
privacy preserving key generation scheme (PPKG-ABE)
includes seven fundamental algorithms: Setup, UserTemKeyGen, BlindTokenGen, BlindKenGen, KeyExtra, Encrypt, and
Decrypt. The specific algorithms are described as follows:
Setup(𝜅)→ 𝑃𝑃, 𝑀𝐾: the setup algorithm is run by
KGC, it inputs security parameter 𝜅, and it outputs public
parameters 𝑃𝑃 and master secret key 𝑀𝑆𝐾.
UserTemKeyGen(𝑃𝑃, 𝜅)→ 𝑇𝑃𝐾𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟 , 𝑇𝑆𝐾𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟 : the user’s
temporary-key generation algorithm is run by user. It takes
𝑃𝑃 and security parameters 𝜅 as input and outputs user’s
temporary public key 𝑇𝑃𝐾𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟 and user’s temporary secret
key 𝑇𝑆𝐾𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟 .
BlindTokenGen(𝑃𝑃, 𝑆, 𝑇𝑃𝐾𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟 )→ 𝑇𝑆 : the blind token
generation algorithm is run by AAC. It takes 𝑃𝑃, user’s
attributes set 𝑆, and user’s temporary public key 𝑇𝑃𝐾𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟 as
input and outputs a blind token 𝑇 for attributes set 𝑆.
BlindKenGen(𝑃𝑃, 𝑀𝑆𝐾, 𝑇𝑆 )→ 𝐵𝑆𝐾: the blind key
generation algorithm is run by KGC. It takes 𝑃𝑃, master secret
key 𝑀𝑆𝐾, and user’s blind token 𝑇𝑆 as input and outputs blind
secret key 𝐵𝑆𝐾 for attributes set 𝑆.
KeyExtra(𝐵𝑆𝐾𝑆 , 𝑇𝑆𝐾𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟 )→ 𝑆𝐾𝑆 : the key extract algorithm is run by user locally. It takes blind secret key 𝐵𝑆𝐾𝑆 and
user’s temporary secret key 𝑇𝑆𝐾𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟 as input and outputs the
final secret key 𝑆𝐾 for attributes set 𝑆.
Encrypt(𝑃𝑃, 𝑀, W)→ 𝐶𝑇: the encryption algorithm
is run by encryptor. It takes 𝑃𝑃, message 𝑀, and access
structure W as input and outputs ciphertext 𝐶𝑇.
Decrypt(𝐶𝑇W , 𝑆𝐾𝑆 )→ 𝑀: the decryption algorithm is
run by decryptor. It takes ciphertext 𝐶𝑇W and secret key 𝑆𝐾𝑆
as input and outputs message 𝑀, if 𝑆 ⊨ W.
We note, in PPKG-ABE scheme, that AAC is responsible
for auditing user’s attributes and issuing blind token 𝑇𝑆 to
user. The blind token includes a description of the authenticity of user’s attributes, along with the signature of AAC, and
reveals on information about specific attributes.
3.3. Security Model. We define the security in two aspects:
confidentiality and privacy. Specifically, in this security
model, we do not allow AAC and KGC to collude.

Security and Communication Networks
3.3.1. Confidentiality. We introduce the selective security
model of choosing plaintext attacks for the PPKG-ABE
scheme. The specific process is working between adversary
A and challenger C:
Init. A specifies an access structure W∗ for challenge.
Setup. C calls the Setup algorithm and returns 𝑃𝑃 to A.
Phase 2. A queries secret key on any attributes set 𝑆 ⊭ W∗ .
C returns the secret key 𝑆𝐾 for 𝑆.
Challenge. A submits two messages 𝑀0∗ and 𝑀1∗ , where
|𝑀0∗ | = |𝑀1∗ |. C chooses 𝑏 ∈ 0, 1 randomly and encrypts
𝑀𝑏∗ under W∗ . Then, it returns 𝐶𝑇∗ to A.
Phase 3. Repeats as Phase 2.
Guess. A guesses 𝑏 for 𝑏. The advantage 𝐴𝑑V for A is defined
as 𝑃𝑟[𝑏 = 𝑏] - 1/2.
Definition 4. The PPKG-ABE scheme is selectively INDCPA secure if 𝐴𝑑V is negligible for any polynomial time
adversaries.
3.3.2. Privacy. We introduce a new security game for defining
privacy. In this game, we define the following two oracles.
Blind Token Oracle O𝐵𝑇 (𝑆): it takes attributes set 𝑆 as input
and outputs corresponding blind token 𝑇𝑆 .
Blind Key Oracle O𝐵𝐾 (𝑇𝑆 ): it takes blind token 𝑇𝑆 as input
and outputs corresponding blind key 𝐵𝑆𝐾𝑆 .
The specific process is working between adversary A and
challenger C:
Setup. C calls the Setup algorithm and returns 𝑃𝑃 to A.
Phase 5. A queries blind token oracle O𝐵𝑇 and blind key
oracle freely.
Challenge. A submits two attributes sets 𝑆∗0 and 𝑆∗1 , where
|𝑆∗0 | = |𝑆∗1 |. C chooses 𝑏 ∈ {0, 1} randomly and queries blind
token oracle O𝐵𝑇 on input 𝑆∗𝑏 . It returns blind token 𝑇𝑆∗𝑏 to A.
Phase 6. Repeats as Phase 5.
Guess. A guesses 𝑏 for 𝑏. The advantage 𝐴𝑑V for A is defined
as 𝑃𝑟[𝑏 = 𝑏] - 1/2.
Definition 7. The PPKG-ABE scheme is privacy-protected in
key generation phase, if 𝐴𝑑V is negligible for any polynomial
time adversaries.

4. A Specific PPKG-ABE Scheme
4.1. Construction. In this construction, the PPKG-ABE
scheme is constructed on the basis of [27], which only
supports AND gates. Suppose that the attribute universe is
𝑈={𝑎𝑡𝑡1 , 𝑎𝑡𝑡2 , . . . , 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑛 }, where each 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖 has 2 values: “+” and
“−”. The “+” denotes that user owns this attribute, while the
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“−” denotes that user does not own this attribute. The specific
scheme is as follows:
Setup(𝜅, 𝑈): the setup algorithm is run by KGC. It takes
security parameters 𝜅 and attribute universe 𝑈 as input,
where |𝑈| = 𝑛. The algorithm first chooses 𝑞 order bilinear
groups G1 , G2 , and G𝑇, where 𝑔 is a generator of G1 and ℎ is
a generator of G2 . Let 𝐻 be a cryptographic hash function;
𝐻 : G1 → G2 . For 𝑖 ∈ [1, 𝑛], it chooses 𝑟𝑖 , 𝑟𝑛+𝑖 ∈ Z∗𝑝 ,
𝑠𝑖 , 𝑠𝑛+𝑖 ∈ G2 randomly and sets 𝑢𝑖 = 𝑔−𝑟𝑖 and ℎ𝑖 = 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑠𝑖 ).
It outputs
𝑃𝑃 fl {𝑔, ℎ, (𝑢𝑘 , ℎ𝑘 )𝑘∈[1,2𝑛] , 𝐻} ,
𝑀𝑆𝐾 fl {(𝑟𝑘 , 𝑠𝑘 )𝑘∈[1,2𝑛] } .

(3)

(4)

Then, it runs standard signature algorithm on 𝑡𝑆 to get a
signature Σ and returns 𝑇𝑆 = (𝑡𝑆 , Σ) to user.
BlindKenGen(𝑃𝑃, 𝑀𝑆𝐾, 𝑇𝑆 ): the user submits the token
𝑇𝑆 corresponding to attributes set 𝑆 to the KGC for applying
secret key. KGC first checks that all 𝑥𝑖 , 𝑦𝑖 , 𝑧𝑖,0 , 𝑧𝑖,1 ∈ G1 , 𝑧𝑖,0 ≠
𝑧𝑖,1 and that Σ is legal. If not, it aborts outputting ⊥; otherwise
it randomly chooses 𝑢𝑖,0 , 𝑢𝑖,1 , V𝑖,0 , V𝑖,1 ← Z𝑞 for 𝑖 ∈ [1, 𝑛] and
calculates the following values:

𝑘𝑖,0 = (𝑧𝑖,0 )

⋅

𝑢

𝑢𝑖,1

It returns 𝐵𝑆𝐾 to user.
KeyExtra(𝑇𝑆𝐾𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟 , 𝐵𝑆𝐾): the key extract algorithm is run
by user.
For 𝑖 ∈ [1, 𝑛], if 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖 =“+”, it sets 𝑤𝑖 = 𝑤𝑖,0 , 𝑐𝑖 = 𝑐𝑖,0 ; else if
𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖 = “ − ”, it sets 𝑤𝑖 = 𝑤𝑖,1 , 𝑐𝑖 = 𝑐𝑖,1 and calculates
𝛽

𝑘𝑖 = (𝑤𝑖 ) 𝑖 ,
𝑐𝑖
.
𝑘𝑖

(7)

𝑆𝐾 fl ⟨V, {𝜎𝑖 }𝑖∈[1,𝑛] ⟩ .

(8)

It outputs

We note, in the above key issuing procedure, that KGC
cannot obtain the specific attributes of user, and AAC cannot
obtain the secret key.
Encrypt(𝑃𝐾, 𝑀, W): it takes public key 𝑃𝐾, AND gate
structure W, and message 𝑀 as input, where W = ⋀𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖 ∈𝐴𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖 ,
for 𝐴 is the related attributes set, and 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖 ∈ {“ + ”,“ −
”}. It chooses 𝑠 ∈ Z∗𝑝 randomly and sets ⟨𝑢𝐴, ℎ𝐴⟩ =
⟨∏𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖 ∈𝐴𝑢𝑖 , ∏𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖 ∈𝐴ℎ𝑖 ⟩, where for each 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖 ∈ 𝐴,
if 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖 =“+”, ⟨𝑢𝑖 , ℎ𝑖 ⟩ = ⟨𝑢𝑖 , ℎ𝑖 ⟩
if 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖 = “ − ”, ⟨𝑢𝑖 , ℎ𝑖 ⟩ = ⟨𝑢𝑛+𝑖 , ℎ𝑛+𝑖 ⟩
Then, it computes 𝑐𝑡0 = 𝑀 ⋅ ℎ𝑠𝐴, 𝑐𝑡1 = 𝑔𝑠 , 𝑐𝑡2 = 𝑢𝑠𝐴.
The ciphertext is defined as 𝐶𝑇 = (W, 𝑐𝑡0 , 𝑐𝑡1 , 𝑐𝑡2 ).
Decrypt(𝑃𝑃, 𝑆𝐾𝑆, 𝐶𝑇): if 𝑆 ⊨ W, the decryption algorithm
computes 𝑠𝑘 = ⟨V, 𝜎 = ∏𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖 ∈𝐴𝜎𝑖 ⟩, for related attributes set 𝐴.
Then, it computes the message
𝑐𝑡0
𝑀=
.
(9)
𝑒 (𝑐𝑡1 , 𝜎) ⋅ 𝑒 (𝑐𝑡2 , V)
4.2. Correctness. The correctness is guaranteed by
𝑒 (𝑐𝑡1 , 𝜎) ⋅ 𝑒 (𝑐𝑡2 , V) = 𝑒 (𝑔𝑠 , ∏ 𝜎𝑖 ) 𝑒 ( ∏ 𝑢𝑠𝑖 , V)
𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖 ∈𝐴

𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖 ∈𝐴

𝑠

= ∏ (𝑒 (𝑔, 𝜎𝑖 ) ⋅ 𝑒 (𝑢𝑖 , V))
𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖 ∈𝐴

= ∏ (𝑒 (𝑔, 𝑠𝑖 V𝑟𝑖 ) ⋅ 𝑒 (𝑔−𝑟𝑖 , V))

𝑠

(10)

𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖 ∈𝐴

= ∏ (𝑒 (𝑔, 𝑠𝑖 ) ⋅ 𝑒 (𝑔, V𝑟𝑖 ) ⋅ 𝑒 (𝑔−𝑟𝑖 , V))

𝑠

𝑠

V
𝑦𝑖 𝑖,0

𝑤𝑖,1 = 𝑥𝑖 𝑖,1 ⋅ ℎV𝑖,1 ,
𝑘𝑖,1 = (𝑧𝑖,1 )

(6)

𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖 ∈𝐴

𝑢

𝑤𝑖,0 = 𝑥𝑖 𝑖,0 ⋅ ℎV𝑖,0 ,
𝑢𝑖,0

𝐵𝑆𝐾 = ⟨V, {(𝑤𝑖,0 , 𝑐𝑖,0 ) , (𝑤𝑖,1 , 𝑐𝑖,1 )}𝑖∈[1,𝑛] ⟩ .

𝜎𝑖 =

In general speaking, {⟨𝑢𝑖 , ℎ𝑖 ⟩|𝑖 ∈ [1, 𝑛]} correspond to the
positive attributes and {⟨𝑢𝑛+𝑖 , ℎ𝑛+𝑖 ⟩|𝑖 ∈ [1, 𝑛]} correspond to
the negative attributes.
UserTemKeyGen(𝑃𝑃, 𝜅): the user’s temporary-key generation algorithm is run by user. It takes public parameters 𝑃𝑃
and security parameters 𝜅 as input and chooses 𝛽𝑖 ← Z𝑞
randomly for 𝑖 ∈ [1, 𝑛], as its temporary secret key 𝑇𝑆𝐾𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟.
Then, it calculates the temporary public key 𝑇𝑃𝐾𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟 =
{ℎ𝛽𝑖 }𝑖∈[1,𝑛] .
BlindTokenGen(𝑃𝑃, 𝑆, 𝑇𝑃𝐾𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟 ): the blind token generation algorithm is run by AAC. It takes public parameters
𝑃𝑃, user’s attributes set 𝑆, and user’s temporary public key
𝑇𝑃𝐾𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟 as input. 𝑆 expresses an attributes set, which includes
𝑛 signs, e.g., 𝑆 = (+, −, + . . . , +), where “+” indicates that the
user owns this attribute and “−” indicates that the user does
not own this attribute. It selects 𝛼𝑖 , 𝛾𝑖 ← Z𝑝 randomly and
calculates ℎ𝛼𝑖 , (ℎ𝛽𝑖 )𝛼𝑖 , and ℎ𝛾𝑖 , for 𝑖 ∈ [1, 𝑛].
If the attribute 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖 =“+”∈ 𝑆, then it sets 𝑥𝑖 = ℎ𝛼𝑖 , 𝑦𝑖 = ℎ𝛽𝑖 ,
𝑧𝑖,0 = ℎ𝛼𝑖 𝛽𝑖 , 𝑧𝑖,1 = ℎ𝛾𝑖 . Otherwise, the attribute 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖 = “−” ∈ 𝑆,
and it sets 𝑥𝑖 = ℎ𝛼𝑖 , 𝑦𝑖 = ℎ𝛽𝑖 , 𝑧𝑖,0 = ℎ𝛾𝑖 , 𝑧𝑖,1 = ℎ𝛼𝑖 𝛽𝑖 .
𝑡𝑆 = {𝑡𝑖 = (𝑥𝑖 ‖ 𝑦𝑖 ‖ 𝑧𝑖,0 ‖ 𝑧𝑖,1 )}𝑖∈[1,𝑛] .

The blind secret key

= ∏ (𝑒 (𝑔, 𝑠𝑖 )) = ∏ ℎ𝑠𝑖 = ℎ𝑠𝐴.
𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖 ∈𝐴

𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖 ∈𝐴

(5)

5. Proof of Security
V

⋅ 𝑦𝑖 𝑖,1

Then, it randomly chooses V ∈ G2 for each user and
calculates 𝜎𝑖,0 = 𝑠𝑖 V𝑟𝑖 , 𝜎𝑖,1 = 𝑠𝑛+𝑖 V𝑟𝑛+𝑖 , for 𝑖 ∈ [1, 𝑛]. It calculates
𝑐𝑖,0 = 𝜎𝑖,0 ⋅ 𝑘𝑖,0 , 𝑐𝑖,1 = 𝜎𝑖,1 ⋅ 𝑘𝑖,1 , for 𝑖 ∈ [1, 𝑛].

5.1. Confidentiality
Theorem 8. If the decisional 𝑛−BDHE assumption holds for
bilinear groups G1 , G2 , and G𝑇, our PPGK-ABE scheme is
selectively IND-CPA secure.
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Proof. If the adversary A can win above security game with
nonnegligible advantage, we can construct an algorithm B to
break the decision 𝑛−BDHE assumption. B plays the security
game with A as follows:
∗

Init. B receives challenge gate W = ⋀𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖
∗

∗

𝑗

∈𝐴∗ 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑗
∗

from A.

We suppose |𝐴 | = 𝑚 < 𝑛, and 𝐼 = {𝑖𝑗 |𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑗 ∈ 𝐴 }.

Setup. B chooses 𝑗∗ ∈ [1, 𝑚], 𝑟𝑘 ∈ Z∗𝑝 , 𝑥𝑘 ∈ G2 , 𝑟𝑖𝑗 , 𝑎𝑖𝑗 ∈ Z∗𝑝
randomly, for 𝑘 ∈ [1, 2𝑛], 𝑗 ∈ [1, 𝑚].
For 𝑖𝑗 ∈ 𝐼∗ − {𝑗∗ }, B computes public parameters as
follows:
(1) If 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑗 = +,

Phase 9. A queries secret key on any attributes set 𝑆 |≠ W∗ =
⋀𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖 ∈𝐴∗ 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑗 ; therefore, ∃𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑗 ∈ A∗ , s.t. either 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑗 ∈ 𝑆 for
𝑗

𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑗 = −, or 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑗 ∉ 𝑆 for 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑗 = +. Suppose that 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑗 ∈ 𝑆 |≠
W. B chooses 𝑧 ∈ Z∗𝑝 randomly and computes ] = 𝑔𝑖𝑗 𝑔𝑧 .
𝑟

For 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑗 , B computes 𝜎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖𝑗 +𝑛 (𝑔𝑖𝑗 𝑔𝑧 ) 𝑖𝑗 +𝑛 .
𝑗
For 𝑎𝑡𝑡i ≠ 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑗 , 𝜎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖 is computed as follows:
(1) If 𝑖 = 𝑖𝑘 ∈ 𝐼∗ − {𝑗∗ } (𝑘 ≠ 𝑗∗ ), calculate
𝑟𝑖𝑘

−𝑟𝑖𝑗 +𝑛

(𝑢𝑖𝑗 +𝑛 , ℎ𝑖𝑗 +𝑛 ) = (𝑔

𝑎𝑖

(11)
, 𝑒 (𝑔, 𝑥𝑖𝑗 +𝑛 )) .

𝜎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖 = 𝑔

−𝑟𝑖𝑗

, 𝑒 (𝑔, 𝑥𝑖𝑗 )) ,
(12)

𝑎

𝑟

𝑘=𝑖̸ 𝑗

−𝑧

( ∏
𝑘∈𝐼∗ −{𝑗∗ }

) (𝑢𝑖∗𝑗 ) .

𝑆𝐾 = ⟨], {𝜎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖 | 𝑖 ∈ [1, 𝑛]}⟩ .

𝑢𝐼∗ = 𝑢𝑖𝑗∗

(𝑢𝑖𝑗∗ , ℎ𝑖𝑗∗ )
∏ 𝑔𝑛+1−𝑘 , 𝑒 (𝑔, ℎ)

𝑎𝑖

𝑗∗

𝑒 (𝑔, ℎ)

𝛼𝑛+1

𝑘∈𝐼∗ −{𝑖𝑗∗ }

−𝑟𝑖 ∗ +𝑛

(𝑢𝑖𝑗∗ +𝑛 , ℎ𝑖𝑗∗ +𝑛 ) = (𝑔

𝑗

) (13)

(17)

−𝑟𝑖 ∗
𝑗

(18)

∏ 𝑢𝑘

𝑘∈𝐼∗ −{𝑗∗ }

= (𝑔𝑟𝑖 𝑗

∗

∏ 𝑔𝑛+1−𝑘 )

𝑘∈𝐼∗ −{𝑗∗ }

ℎ𝐼∗ = ℎ𝑖𝑗∗

, 𝑒 (𝑔, 𝑥𝑖𝑗∗ +𝑛 )) .

−1
∏ 𝑔𝑟𝑘 𝑔𝑛+1−𝑘
= 𝑔𝑟𝐼∗ ,

𝑘∈𝐼∗ −{𝑗∗ }

∏ ℎ𝑘

(19)

𝑘∈𝐼∗ −{𝑗∗ }

= 𝑒 (𝑔, ℎ)

(2) If 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑗∗ = −,

𝑎𝑖

𝑗∗

𝛼𝑛+1

⋅ 𝑒 (𝑔, ℎ)

∏ 𝑒 (𝑔, ℎ)
∗

𝑎𝑘

∗

𝑘∈𝐼 −{𝑗 }

, 𝑒 (𝑔, 𝑥𝑖𝑗∗ )) ,

= 𝑒 (𝑔, ℎ)

(𝑢𝑖𝑗∗ +𝑛 , ℎ𝑖𝑗∗ +𝑛 )
𝑟

𝑗∗

𝑚
Challenge. For 𝑎𝐼∗ = ∑𝑚
𝑗=1 𝑎𝑖𝑗 , 𝑟𝐼∗ = ∑𝑗=1 𝑟𝑖𝑗 , ⟨𝑢𝐼∗ , ℎ𝐼∗ ⟩ is
calculated as follows:

For 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑗 = 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑗∗ , B computes as follows:
(1) If 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑗∗ = +,

= (𝑔 𝑖𝑗∗ ⋅

𝑟𝑖

(b) 𝜎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖+𝑛 (𝑔𝑖𝑗 𝑔𝑧 )𝑟𝑖+𝑛 , if 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖 = −.
B answers secret key query for 𝑆:

−1
(𝑢𝑖𝑗 +𝑛 , ℎ𝑖𝑗 +𝑛 ) = (𝑔 𝑖𝑗 𝑔𝑛+1−𝑖
, 𝑒 (𝑔, ℎ) 𝑖𝑗 ) .
𝑗

(𝑢𝑖𝑗∗ , ℎ𝑖𝑗∗ ) = (𝑔

(𝑔𝑖𝑗 )



(𝑢𝑖𝑗 , ℎ𝑖𝑗 ) = (𝑔

𝑟

𝑗∗

(3) If 𝑖 ∉ 𝐼∗ , calculate

(a) 𝜎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖 (𝑔𝑖𝑗 𝑔𝑧 )𝑟𝑖 , if 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖 = +;

(2) If 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑗 = −,

= (𝑔 𝑖𝑗∗ ⋅

(16)

(2) If 𝑖 = 𝑖𝑗∗ , calculate

𝑎

𝑟

−1
(𝑢𝑖𝑗 , ℎ𝑖𝑗 ) = (𝑔 𝑖𝑗 𝑔𝑛+1−𝑖
, 𝑒 (𝑔, ℎ) 𝑖𝑗 ) ,
𝑗

−𝑧

𝜎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖 = 𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑘 (𝑔𝑖𝑗 ) 𝑔𝑛+1−𝑖𝑘 +𝑖𝑗 (𝑢𝑖𝑘 ) .

(14)
∏ 𝑔𝑛+1−𝑘 , 𝑒 (𝑔, ℎ)

𝑎𝑖

𝑗∗

𝑒 (𝑔, ℎ)

𝛼𝑛+1

𝑎𝐼∗ +𝛼𝑛+1

A submits 𝑀0 and 𝑀1 with |𝑀0 | = |𝑀1 |. B randomly
chooses 𝑏 ∈ {0, 1}, 𝑠 ∈ Z∗𝑝 and computes
𝐶𝑇∗ = (W∗ , 𝑐𝑡∗0 = 𝑀𝑏 𝑇𝑒 (𝑔, ℎ)

),

𝑘∈𝐼∗ −{𝑖𝑗∗ }



= 𝑔𝑠 𝑟𝐼∗ ) .

For 𝑖𝑗 ∉ 𝐼∗ , B computes
−𝑟𝑖𝑗

(𝑢𝑖𝑗 , ℎ𝑖𝑗 ) = (𝑔

(15)
, 𝑒 (𝑔, 𝑥𝑖𝑗 +𝑛 )) .

𝑠 𝑎𝐼∗



, 𝑐𝑡∗1 = 𝑔𝑠 , 𝑐𝑡∗2
(20)

If 𝑇 = 𝑒(𝑔𝑛+1 , ℎ), 𝐶𝑇∗ is a valid ciphertext; else if 𝑇 is
random, 𝐶𝑇∗ is independent of 𝑏.

, 𝑒 (𝑔, 𝑥𝑖𝑗 )) ,

−𝑟𝑖𝑗 +𝑛

(𝑢𝑖𝑗 +𝑛 , ℎ𝑖𝑗 +𝑛 ) = (𝑔

.

Guess. If A outputs 𝑏 = 𝑏, B guesses that 𝑇 = 𝑒(𝑔𝑛+1 , ℎ).
Otherwise, B guesses that 𝑇 is random.
Therefore, B can break the decisional 𝑛−BDHE assumption with nonnegligible advantage.
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Figure 2: Application in industrial cloud.

5.2. Privacy
Theorem 10. If the DDH assumption holds in G2 , our PPGKABE scheme is privacy preserving in key generation phase.
Proof. If DDH assumption holds in G2 , no probabilistic
polynomial-time adversary can distinguish following tuple:
(ℎ𝛼 , ℎ𝛽 , ℎ𝛼𝛽 , ℎ𝛾 ) and (ℎ𝛼 , ℎ𝛽 , ℎ𝛾 , ℎ𝛼𝛽 ), where ℎ is a generator
of group G2 , and 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾 are selected from 𝑍∗𝑝 randomly.
Therefore, no probabilistic polynomial-time adversary can
win the security game for privacy.

6. Application in Industrial Cloud
Nowadays, new technological revolution represented by Big
Data, cloud computing, and Internet of Things is changing the traditional industrial manufacturing system [28,
29]. Industrial cloud provides more convenient and secure
cooperation model for the industrial enterprises [30–32].
The ABE scheme has been gradually used in the industrial
cloud environment. In these applications, the qualifications,
patents, and procurement plans owned by an enterprise often
represent its attributes. Using traditional ABE system, the
enterprise has to disclose these attributes' information that
may relate to business secret to the KGC for applying the
corresponding private key. Our PPGK-ABE scheme can solve
this problem correctly. In this section, we introduce how
to deploy our scheme in the industrial cloud environment.
Figure 2 shows the specific structure of the application using
our PPGK-ABE scheme. It consists of the following entities:
(i) Industry Enterprise: in this system, the role of industry enterprise is data user. They want to get useful
information according to their business, but they do
not want to reveal their attributes information that
may relate to their business secret to KGC.

(ii) Industry Alliance Manager: in this system, the role of
the industry alliance manager is AAC, which issues
blind token for the attributes of industry enterprises
after reviewing the relevant evidence.
(iii) KGC: its responsibility is to issue the corresponding
key to the attributes of industry enterprises. In this
system, KGC cannot get these attributes.
(iv) Industrial Information Provider: in this system,
industrial information providers are the members
of the industrial alliance and include manufacturing
enterprises, sales enterprises, logistics enterprises,
scientific research institutions, consultant firms, and
so on. They will use ABE scheme to share their
encrypted data.
(v) Industrial Cloud: industrial cloud serves as data
storage center and data sharing center in this system.
In order to protect security and privacy of industrial
Big Data, the industrial information providers upload
their data in encrypted form.
The specific workflow is as follows:
(1) After checking the relevant evidence, the industry enterprise and the industry alliance manager
run UserTemKeyGen and BlindTokenGen algorithms,
respectively. The industry enterprise gets the blind
token corresponding to its attributes.
(2) When the industry enterprises need to ask for their
attributes keys, they will submit their blind tokens
to KGC. The KGC runs BlindKenGen algorithm and
returns blind secret keys to the industry enterprises.
In this process, the KGC cannot get any information
about the enterprises’ attributes.
(3) After receiving the blind secret keys, the industry
enterprises run KeyExtra algorithm to obtain their
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own secret key. Even if the industry alliance manager
knows the attributes of industry enterprises, it does
not know the secret keys corresponding to these
attributes.
(4) The industrial information providers run Encrypt
algorithm to encrypt the industrial data based on
some access policies. Then, they share encrypted data
on the cloud. Only the enterprises that meet the
policies can access corresponding data.
(5) The industry enterprises acquire encrypted data from
the cloud and run Decrypt algorithm to get plaintext.

In the above application, industrial information providers
can share industrial data according to enterprises’ attributes.
Only the enterprises that meet the access policy are able
to access data. Unlike traditional ABE solutions, in this
application, the attributes information of enterprises will not
be known by KGC. The business secret of enterprises is
protected.
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